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NATIONAL HEALTH LAW PROGRAM
10995 Le Conte Ave., Los Angeles, Cal. 90024, (213) 825-7601

A New Look at HMOs
As the economic picture worsens, state governments,
particularly those constitutionally prohibited from operating
at deficit levels, will be looking for ways to cut expenses, and
Medicaid is likely to be one of the state programs targeted
for cost curtailment. (For a detailed discussion of Medicaid,
see Butler, The Medicaid Program, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE
REV. 2 (May 1974).)
Under the federal statutes and regulations, states
currently have a variety of options for lowering Medicaid
program costs, including restricting eligibility and the scope
of benefits. An alternative method is the Pre-Paid Health
Plan (PHP) which California adopted several years ago in
an effort to lower its Medicaid (Medi-Cal) program costs.
While other states-are considering adopting this strategy,
California and HEW are conducting a massive re-examination
of the system, which could lead to its overhaul or even abandonment. Accordingly, Legal Services attorneys representing
Medicaid recipients should be aware of the California experience with PHPs, and with' the state and federal efforts to
re-appraise them.
The PHP, also known as the Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO), in theory provides a complete range
of health services to an enrolled population for a fixed amount
of money. Theoretically, the HMO has many potential advantages over conventional fee-for-service care: comprehensive, non-fragmented care; greater emphasis on early diagnosis and other preventive measures reducing the incidence
of hospitalization; increased physician productivity through
efficient organization and the use of intermediate level health
practitioners; and improvements in the quality of care
through informal and continuous peer supervision. Because
the care which HMOs provide is financed by fixed capitation
fees paid periodically, the payor (whether the individual or
a government agency) knows in advance the health costs
for a given period of time. (There are a number of HMOs
with a long history of successful delivery of health care, including Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Health Insurance
Plan of Greater New York, and the Group Health Cooperative
of Puget Sound. (For more extensive discussion of HMOs see
Stern, Health Care Expansion, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
89 (June 1974); and Stern, The Health Maintenance Organization Act, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 604 (Jan. 1975).)
The California experience has shown, however, that*
a loosely regulated PHP system can result in much lower
quality medical care for the poor-without even lowering
costs. Apart from adopting the economies of a large organization, there are only two ways a PHP can keep its operating
costs down: it can either prevent its patients from developing
expensive medical problems, or it can fail to treat them.
Many of the newly developed PHPs in California have shown
more interest in the latter method than the former.
Some PHPs simply have failed to contract with sufficient providers to cover patient needs. Even among PHPs
which have the resources, a pattern of refusing treatment
for enrollees with serious (i.e., expensive) medical problems
has developed. Patients have been ignored or diverted to
county facilities. (Theoretically, the PHP remains liable for
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the cost of care, but county hospital efforts to collect generally
fail.) As a result, the care provided under the PHP system
has been considerably less than that mandated by Title XIX
and its regulations, and by the standard contract between
the state and the PHPs.
Once the patient is enrolled in a PHP, the state will
not pay for services given elsewhere until the patient is
formally disenrolled. Initially, the state did not even have a
disenrollment procedure. Protests produced one, but its
operation is so cumbersome that many patients spend months
in a health care limbo, tied to a plan they distrust or that
will not provide care, and unable to obtain health care
elsewhere.
In response to consumer protests, newspaper articles
and legislative investigations, California's new administration has declared a moratorium on new PHP contracts and
is conducting an intensive investigation of existing plans.
As a result of the 1972 amendments to the Social Security
Act, HEW is preparing regulations governing HMO participation in the Medicaid program. NHelp will be monitoring
the manner in which both the Brown administration and
HEW respond to the California experience in working out
formulas to shape future HMO activity. Legal Services
attorneys with clients receiving Medicaid should be alert
to these developments and to their own state's activities in
this area. Attorneys and client groups should strongly urge
that PHPs not be used as a vehicle for providing health care
to the poor until such regulations and other means are
adopted to prevent a recurrence of the disastrous California
experience. Contact this program if you have information
or questions concerning PHPs.

NATIONAL JUVENILE LAW CENTER
3642 Lindell Blvd., St. Louis, Mo. 63108, (314) 533-8868

Notice in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
Among the rights extended to juveniles via the fourteenth amendment is the right to notice of charges in a delinquency proceeding. In order to comply with due process
requirements, notice "must be given sufficiently in advance
of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity
to prepare will be afforded, and it must 'set forth the alleged
misconduct with particularity."' In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1,
33 (1967).
Although the Court in Gault did not specify what would
constitute timely and specific notice, it did cite several cases
that had discussed notice as examples of the application of
this due process requirement. 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967) n. 53.
In Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948), the Court held that
due process forbade conviction of a man under a criminal
statute "for violation of which... [hie had not been charged".
In In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948), the Court found due
process violated where a defendant was not afforded "reasonable" notice of the charge against him and an opportunity
to be heard. Mullane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co.,
339 U.S. 306 (1950), appears to give a slightly fuller explanation of due process requirements. There, in a case dealing
with notice in a civil context, the Court calls for notice "reaCLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW

sonably calculated, under all circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford
them an opportunity to present their objections.... The notice
must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required
information.., and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance ....339 U.S. at 314. This
holding is restated in Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545
(1965), another civil case and the last example suggested by
the Court in footnote 53.
Despite these suggestions, the problem of what constitutes adequate notice continues to plague juvenile courts.
Furthermore, by suggesting two criminal and two civil cases
as examples, the Court added the issue of whether a civil or
a criminal standard for notice should be applied. Courts
that have addressed this issue have reached different conclusions. For example, in New York, Mississippi, Georgia,
Arizona, California and Illinois, courts going beyond the
dictates of statutory provisions have maintained that a criminal standard must be met. Thus one court dismissed a petition because it failed to meet the same standards of sufficiency
required of a criminal information. In re Walsh, 300 N.Y.S.
2d 859 (Fain. Ct. 1969). Another court reversed an adjudication of delinquency because the petition failed to cite the
criminal statute allegedly violated by the child, and so charged
an offense with less particularity than that required in a criminal indictment. In re Dennis, 291 So.2d 731 (Miss. 1974).
Still other courts have reversed where a child was found
delinquent of an offense other than that alleged in the petition. See e.g., D.P. v. State, 200 S.E.2d 499 (Ga. App. 1973);
In re Maricopa County, Juvenile Action No. J-75755, 521
P.2d 641 (Ariz. App. 1974); In reM., 510 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1973).
An Illinois appellate court succinctly stated the reason
for notification that meets the same standard of specificity
required in a criminal case. A juvenile must have notice of
the charges against him set out with "particularity" so that
he "will be able to prepare a proper defense and conduct
'such investigation [of the charges] as may be necessary'...."
In re Bryant, 310 N.E.2d 713 at 716 (Ill.
App. 1974). In
Texas, New Jersey and Louisiana, on the other hand, satisfaction of criminal notice standards has not been held imperative. Carillov. State, 480 S.W. 2d 612 (Tex. 1972); In reL.B.,
240 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. 1968); State ex rel. Breswell, 294
So.2d 896 (La. App. 1974).
Where a civil standard predominates, courts have relied
for justification upon the idea that a juvenile proceeding is
civil in nature (see e.g. Carillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612
(Tex. 1972)), and have apparently ignored the seriousness
of the possible dispositions facing the child upon adjudication.
The paternalistic view that calls for informality of
procedure in a juvenile hearing is another breeding ground
for this kind of decision. Because "lay" personnel often prepare these petitions, courts have felt that they should not be
held to the higher standard- required by a criminal court.
See In re L.B., 240 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. 1968). These decisions appear to indicate that administrative expediency is
more important than the protection of a child's right to be
made aware of the exact nature of the charges brought against
him and his corollary right to prepare and present an adequate defense.
Those courts that require a criminal standard appear to
be most closely aligned with the stance adopted by the Supreme Court in its decisions of recent years. First in Gault
and later in In re Winship, 391 U.S. 358 (1970), and McMARCH 1975

Keiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971), the Court
stressed the need to look past the simplistic labels often
attached to juvenile proceedings and to consider instead
the substance of the proceeding and the possible consequences
to a child when considering whether that child is entitled to
protection of a due process right. Because in a delinquency
proceeding a juvenile is normally accused of an act that
would be a crime if committed by an adult, and, more importantly, is subject to possible institutionalization upon a
finding of delinquency, he should be entitled to the same
standard of notice afforded a criminal defendant.

CENTER ON SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY AND LAW
25 West 43rd St., New York, N.Y. 10036, (212) 354-7670

Supplemental Security Income:
Advocates' Handbook Available
The Center on Social Welfare Policy & Law has completed a 200-page Supplemental Security Income Advocates'
Handbook which reflects program policies and rules in effect
as of January 1975. The handbook explains the various eligibility conditions for SSI, discussing, for example, the meaning
of the federal definition of age, blindness, and disability.
It also includes discussion of such matters as proof requirements related to age, blindness, and disability, and special
questions related to drug addiction and alcoholism, childhood
disability, and vocational rehabilitation requirements. Other
chapters explain the income and resource limits for the program, and provide examples to guide individuals in determining whether clients are financially eligible. The handbook also
contains explanations of various operational aspects of the
program, such as the applications process (which includes
sample application forms), the procedures followed when an
SSI recipient has been overpaid, and the hearing process
and appeal rights.
This handbook is now available for distribution. One
copy will be sent to each OEO-funded Legal Services project
office listed in the September 1974 OEO directory (OEO
Pamphlet 6140-2, "Legal Services Projects and Legal Services
Project Directors"). We would appreciate receiving the
address of any branch office which would like a copy of the
handbook. We regret that we are unable to provide more
than one free copy per office, but additional copies are available at a cost of $3.50 each or $3.00 for ten or more. Copies
will be sent book rate because of high postage costs. This
means approximately three weeks between mailing and
receipt. If you wish to receive additional copies and want
them sent first class, add $1.00 per copy to the cost. In order
to fit this enterprise within our limited staff capacities, we ask
that you include pre-payment with any such orders.
The handbook does not include copies of the program
regulations. The Center has prepared a complete compilation
of SSI program regulations which has now been updated to
January 1975, and this compilation is available from the
National Clearinghouse for Legal Services, 500 N. Michigan
Ave., Suite 2220, Chicago, Ill. 60611, Clearinghouse No.
12,761. These regulations will not be available in codified
form in the C.F.R. until May 1975. It is anticipated that a

